

The Effect of Party Identification (Party-ID) on Split Ticket Voting (STV) in the 2019 Simultaneous Elections in West Sumatra

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Abstract

This study examines the effect of party identification (party-ID) on split-ticket voting behavior in the 2019 Simultaneous Presidential and Legislative Elections in West Sumatra Province, Indonesia. Split-ticket voting refers to the behavior of voters who split their choices between a political party in the legislative election and a presidential candidate from a different coalition in the executive election. Using a quantitative approach based on a field survey of 800 respondents, the findings reveal a significant negative relationship between party-ID and split-ticket voting. The stronger the voter's identification with a particular party, the lower the likelihood of engaging in vote-splitting. These results align with the classic theory proposed in *The American Voter* and underscore the role of partisan affiliation as a key determinant of voting behavior. The study also highlights the contextual dynamics of Indonesia's multiparty system, where weak party-ID contributes to the rise of pragmatic and candidate-centered voting patterns.

Keywords: *Party Identification, Split-Ticket Voting, Voting Behavior, Simultaneous Elections, Party-ID, West Sumatra.*



A. INTRODUCTION

Free, fair, and regularly held general elections (pemil) are a fundamental element of a democratic political system. While not the only important element, presidential and legislative elections serve as a key starting point in determining the direction and stability of government. Election results determine the position of the President and the House of Representatives (DPR), both of which play a central role in shaping state institutions, such as the Supreme Court (MA), the Constitutional Court (MK), the Judicial Commission (KY), the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), Bank Indonesia (BI), the General Elections Commission (KPU), the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), and other state institutions. Therefore, elections, particularly those for the president (executive) and the DPR (legislative), play a strategic role in shaping the institutional structure and political architecture of the country. Elections are not merely a mechanism for filling political positions, but also a vital instrument in governing and achieving constitutional goals.

Globally, almost all countries hold elections. Only a few countries, such as the People's Republic of China, Cuba, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Brunei Darussalam, do not hold them competitively. However, the implementation of elections is not necessarily synonymous with democracy. In authoritarian regimes, elections can be procedural and formalistic, failing to adhere to substantive democratic principles. Conversely, in democratic systems, elections are not only a constitutional mandate but

also the primary mechanism for legitimizing power and ensuring government accountability and effectiveness. Therefore, the quality of democracy depends heavily on the implementation of free, honest, fair, and competitive elections. This diversity of approaches reflects the complexity of understanding voter behavior, including in the context of Indonesia's simultaneous elections, which have opened up space for split-ticket voting, an increasingly relevant electoral behavior phenomenon to be studied.

Political scientists who adopt a political approach focus their analysis on the influence of various political factors in shaping voter preferences. These factors include: political issues and programs, election campaign strategies and intensity, levels of loyalty to political parties (party identification), perceptions of candidates, retrospective evaluations of the government's or incumbent's performance, and prospective expectations of potential new leaders. This approach emphasizes that the decision to vote is not solely influenced by social structure or ideological affiliation, but also by the dynamics of actual and situational political contestation at the time the election takes place.

Elections are a crucial political development instrument for actualizing the principle of popular sovereignty and strengthening the legitimacy of democratic power. The 2019 simultaneous elections marked a significant milestone in Indonesian constitutional history, as they were the first to be held simultaneously for five levels of public office: President/Vice President, House of Representatives (DPR RI), Regional Representatives Council (DPD RI), Provincial DPRD (Regional People's Representative Council), and Regency/City DPRD (Regional People's Representative Council). These simultaneous elections implemented Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013, dated January 23, 2014, which mandated the simultaneous holding of legislative and presidential elections starting in 2019.

The institutional design of elections, particularly simultaneous elections, is known to influence voter behavior, including the tendency for split-ticket voting. This phenomenon refers to voter behavior that separates political parties and candidates within a single election cycle. In the Indonesian context, the 2019 simultaneous elections created room for this behavior, which is suspected to have occurred significantly in several regions, including West Sumatra Province. The academic question that then arises is: Does party identification (party ID) influence the rate of split-ticket voting in the 2019 simultaneous elections in West Sumatra.

Split ticket voting is a form of electoral behavior that describes a voter's decision to split their vote across different elections taking place simultaneously. For example, a voter may vote for a particular party in the legislative (DPR) elections but choose a presidential (executive) candidate from a different party coalition in the presidential election. This phenomenon indicates a mismatch between their preference for a political party and their preference for a presidential candidate within a single election. In the context of simultaneous elections, this type of behavior becomes even more likely because voters are faced with multiple choices simultaneously. Simultaneous elections open up space for voters to evaluate each

candidate and party separately, ultimately enabling splitting of preferences between election types. For example, a voter may vote for the Golkar Party in the legislative elections but choose the Democratic Party's presidential candidate in the presidential election. This decision reflects a deliberate disjunction of preferences between the two types of elections within a single electoral cycle. The conceptualization of STV cannot be reduced to a single sentence definition, as each element of this phenomenon contains complex structural, psychological, and institutional dimensions. In general, two main conditions are prerequisites for the occurrence of STV:

1. Simultaneous elections, when two or more types of elections are held at the same time.
2. The existence of more than one type of election, such as legislative and presidential elections, which gives voters room to differentiate their political preferences between types of public office.

Based on data from the West Sumatra General Elections Commission (KPUD), split ticket voting was found in the 2019 Simultaneous Elections in West Sumatra, both among voters of coalition parties supporting the Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno ticket and the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket. Not all coalition party voters "followed the party line" in choosing their party's presidential candidate. This indicates a difference in preference between the legislative (DPR) and executive (presidential) options, a characteristic of split ticket voting.

The proportion of voters who split ticket voted for the Prabowo-Sandi ticket reached 21.57%, while for the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket, it was 20.9%. This is despite the fact that the coalition supporting Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin consists of ten political parties, a much larger number than the Prabowo-Sandi coalition, which consists of only five parties. If split ticket voting had not occurred, theoretically, the number of votes obtained by the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket in West Sumatra should have been significantly higher. This finding reinforces the indication that voter loyalty to parties is not entirely linear with preference for presidential candidates, especially in the context of simultaneous elections.

From a voter behavior perspective, split ticket voting can be caused by a number of factors. These include weakening loyalty to political parties, the desire to create a balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, and the use of different considerations in selecting legislative and executive candidates (Petrocik & Doherty, 1996; Fiorina, 1988; Jacobson, 1990). In a multiparty system like Indonesia, voters may also be driven by strategic motivations to prevent the victory of their least preferred party (Evans et al., 1998). On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the role of campaigns and political communication argue that split ticket voting is a response to campaign intensity and candidate quality. Voter perceptions of campaign messages or candidate track records can drive inconsistent voting behavior across election types (Beck et al., 1992; Petrocik, 1991; Wattenberg, 1991).

This research highlights two main aspects. First, it analyzes the relationship between party identification and the propensity for split-ticket voting. Several previous studies, particularly in countries with established democracies, have shown

that high levels of party identification tend to be negatively correlated with split-ticket voting behavior (Fiorina, 1988). This means that the stronger a voter's affiliation with a party, the less likely they are to split their choice between legislative and executive elections.

However, in the Indonesian context, this dynamic has not been fully confirmed. High or low party-ID does not always correlate linearly with split-ticket voting, indicating a different cultural and institutional context compared to Western countries. In the Indonesian context, for example, a voter who identifies as a supporter of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) tends to vote for a presidential candidate nominated by PDIP, such as Megawati Soekarnoputri in the past. In this case, party-ID serves as a primary determinant of candidate choice. However, not all PDIP supporters will vote for Megawati, and not all Megawati voters identify with PDIP. This suggests that party-ID is not the sole determining factor, but remains a key variable in explaining electoral behavior.

This phenomenon indicates that the characteristics of party-ID in Indonesia possess a complexity that has not been fully explained by theories based on a two-party system or a stable ideological electorate. Therefore, this study aims to measure and evaluate the extent of the influence of party ID on the tendency of split-ticket voting behavior, particularly in the context of the 2019 Simultaneous Presidential and Legislative Elections in West Sumatra Province.

The reason West Sumatra Province was chosen as the research location is because it possesses unique political characteristics relevant to examining the phenomenon of split-ticket voting in Indonesia. Historically, West Sumatra is known as a region with a high level of political awareness, supported by Islamic intellectual traditions and the Minangkabau political heritage, which is egalitarian and critical of power. In the context of the 2019 Simultaneous Elections, this province demonstrated a striking discrepancy between the vote share of political parties at the legislative level and support for presidential candidates. This phenomenon indicates a non-linear segmentation of voter preferences between party and presidential candidate preferences, a strong indicator of split-ticket voting. Furthermore, West Sumatra is also one of the regions where the Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno ticket garnered significant support, although many parties in the coalition supporting Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin also have electoral bases in the region. This imbalance between legislative and executive support makes West Sumatra an ideal political laboratory for testing how party identification (party-ID) influences split-ticket voting behavior. In other words, this province provides a rich empirical context for understanding the dynamics of voter behavior in a simultaneous election system.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Party identification theory was initially developed in response to empirical findings in the 1950s and 1960s, which indicated that most voters had low levels of political knowledge and minimal understanding of ideological issues. However, they exhibited relatively stable attitudes toward political parties. This finding gave rise to

the idea that party identification represents a form of deep-seated affective orientation that remains relatively constant over the long term.

Furthermore, Campbell and his colleagues defined this concept of identification as "an individual's affective orientation toward important social groups within society." In this context, identification with a political party can be understood as a form of emotional orientation, manifesting in either closeness (positive affection) or rejection (negative affection) toward a particular party. This orientation does not always manifest in explicit support, but it can consistently influence thought patterns and voting behavior.

Theoretically, party identification cannot be reduced to short-term strategic calculations. It reflects deep-seated political affection that is relatively resilient to situational changes or momentary issue contestation. Therefore, party identification has theoretical and practical significance in the study of voter behavior, including in the context of split-ticket voting in multiparty systems like Indonesia. In the Indonesian context, various empirical findings indicate that party identification (party ID) experienced a significant downward trend post-Reformasi. One major consequence of the weakening of party ID is increased voter susceptibility to transactional political practices, particularly vote buying. Voters with strong emotional affiliations to parties generally show greater resistance to offers of material incentives. Conversely, voters without partisan attachments tend to be more easily influenced by material enticements in the electoral process.

The most influential work developing this concept is **The American Voter**, which systematically introduced party ID within a social psychological framework. Party identification is defined as an individual's long-term psychological attachment to a political party (p. 121). This theory states that party ID is formed early in life through political socialization, particularly within the family environment, particularly with parents, and develops into a stable affective affiliation with a particular party.

Under these conditions, the weakening of party identity is not merely a psychological phenomenon, but an indicator of an institutional crisis within Indonesia's party system. Weak electoral loyalty directly impacts inconsistent voting behavior, one of which is reflected in the increasing frequency of split ticket voting, where voters choose candidates from different parties for different positions in simultaneous elections. This phenomenon is an indicator of the fragmentation of voters' political preferences and reflects a weakening affection for party institutions.

C. METHOD

This study uses two analytical approaches to explain the phenomenon of split ticket voting in West Sumatra based on the party ID variable: qualitative and quantitative analysis. Quantitatively, this study uses the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) model. The aim is to test the strength of the causal relationship and influence between party ID and split ticket voting. Through this approach, the level and characteristics of split ticket voting in West Sumatra can be analyzed more

comprehensively and in-depth. The SEM approach is very relevant to use in this study because it is able to evaluate the direct influence of the exogenous latent variable Party Identification (Party-ID), on the main dependent endogenous variable, namely Split Ticket Voting (STV). The stages in SEM analysis, referring to Hair et al. (2014) and Ferdinand (2000), there are several important stages in the SEM analysis process as follows:

1. Development of a theoretical model. Formulating constructs and causal directions based on the literature (partisanship theory, candidate orientation, clientelism, and voter behavior models; Campbell et al., Fiorina, Karp et al., Kitschelt).
2. Path diagram. Visualizes the latent-indicator relationship (measurement model) and the relationship between latent constructs (structural model) with one-way (causal) and two-way (correlation) arrows.
3. Separation of measurement & structural models: (1) Measurement model: validity-reliability test (CFA), including convergent validity (e.g. $AVE \geq 0.50$), composite reliability ($CR \geq 0.70$), and discriminant validity (e.g. Fornell-Larcker/HTMT); (2) Structural model: test of direct/indirect effects and potential mediation.
4. Input matrix. Using covariance to maintain the original scale of the variables and to fit the theoretical framework.
5. Identification and estimation. Ensuring the model is identified (not under-identified); parameter estimation using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
6. Model fit (goodness-of-fit). Assess the model–data fit using several indices, including: χ^2 (model–data consistency), RMSEA (< 0.08 is generally adequate), CFI/TLI/GFI (> 0.90 indicates a good fit).

This dual approach allows for a more comprehensive and in-depth mapping of the levels and characteristics of STV as well as a more comprehensive and in-depth causal examination of the party-ID influence.



Figure 1. Form of structural equation of party ID and STV

With the latent variable Party ID (PI) formed from indicators P_1: Feeling close to a particular political party (P88) and PI_2: How close to that political party (P89) (P167).

D. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. Dynamics of Split-Ticket Voting and Disparity of Electoral Preferences in the 2019 Simultaneous Elections in West Sumatra

The phenomenon of split-ticket voting was also significantly recorded in West Sumatra Province during the 2019 Simultaneous Elections. The five political parties supporting the Prabowo-Sandi ticket received significantly more legislative votes than the candidate pair in the presidential election. The vote difference reached 21.57%, indicating a high level of split-ticket voting in the region. This data was obtained from the official recapitulation results published by the West Sumatra Regional Election Commission (KPUD). This finding indicates that some voters in West Sumatra chose parties supporting Prabowo in the legislative elections, but did not vote for the Prabowo-Sandi ticket in the presidential election.

Table 1. Data Table of Split Ticket Voting for Prabowo-Sandi in the 2019 Election in West Sumatra

Political Party Votes	Prabowo-Sandi Votes	Split Ticket Voting
64.38%	85.95%	21.57%

Meanwhile, in West Sumatra Province, data shows a striking disparity between the votes won by the coalition parties supporting the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket and the votes won by the pair in the presidential election. The ten political parties officially in a coalition supporting the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket received a combined 34.96% of the vote in the 2019 legislative elections. However, in the presidential election in the same province, the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket only received 14.05% of the vote. This 20.91% vote difference clearly reflects the phenomenon of split ticket voting, where some coalition party voters actually voted for the opposing presidential candidate pair, Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno.

This finding indicates that West Sumatra voters' electoral preferences in the presidential election were not entirely consistent with their preferences for political parties in the legislative elections. The large disparity between legislative and executive votes indicates electoral cleavage in voting behavior. This phenomenon is a key indicator of split ticket voting, a situation where voters divide their votes differently in the legislative and presidential elections held simultaneously. The following table shows the combined vote share of the ten political parties supporting the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket in the 2019 election in West Sumatra Province.

Table 2. Data Table of the Combined Number of Votes for the Supporting Coalition Parties (Jokowi-Ma'ruf) in the 2019 Election in West Sumatra

No	Party	Number of Votes	Percent	Coalition Combined Votes
1	NASDEM	206,43	7.57%	39.46%
2	GOLKAR	202,182	7.41%	
3	PPP	141,865	5.2%	
4	PDIP	134,232	4.92%	
5	PKB	88,966	3.26%	
6	HANURA	47,790	1.75%	

7	PBB	45,873	1.68%	
8	PERINDO	43,510	1.6%	
9	PSI	38,373	1.41%	
10	PKPI	4,322	0.16%	

In West Sumatra Province, the five political parties that officially formed a coalition supporting the Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno ticket in the 2019 election secured a total of 64.38% of the vote in the legislative elections. However, in the presidential election held at the same time, the Prabowo-Sandi ticket secured 85.95% of the vote. This 21.57% gap indicates that candidate pair number 02 gained significant additional support from outside the formal electoral base of their supporting parties. This additional support likely came from two sources: voters from the coalition parties of the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket, or independent/non-partisan voters not explicitly affiliated with any political party.

This phenomenon reflects another variant of split ticket voting, where support for the presidential and vice-presidential candidate pair exceeds support for their supporting parties. In this context, the conventional logic of party affiliation is reversed, with candidate personalization appearing to outweigh party loyalty. The high electoral appeal of the Prabowo-Sandi ticket in West Sumatra reinforces the assumption that personal charisma, leadership image, and public perception of the candidate play a significant role in shaping voter preferences, even surpassing the influence of coalition party structures. The following table presents the combined vote share of the five political parties supporting the Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno ticket in the 2019 Election in West Sumatra Province.

Table 3. Data on the Combined Number of Votes for the Coalition Parties Supporting Prabowo-Sandi in the 2019 Election in West Sumatra

No	Party	Number of Votes	Percent	Coalition Combined Votes
1	GERINDRA	560,84	20.56%	64.38%
2	PAN	412,48	15.12%	
3	DEMOKRAT	371,06	13.6%	
4	PKS	356,29	13.06	
5	BERKARYA	55,667	2.04%	

If there had been no split ticket voting among voters of the ten political parties supporting the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket, then theoretically, candidate pair number 01 would not have experienced a 20.91% vote loss due to a shift in their vote to Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno. At the same time, the five political parties supporting Prabowo-Sandi actually gained an additional 21.57% of the vote, likely from voters of the ten parties in the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin coalition or from non-partisan swing voters. In other words, this vote shift indicates a significant shift in preferences among voters of the 01 coalition parties, which is not linear in their choice of presidential candidate.

Meanwhile, the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket received only 14.05% of the vote in the presidential election in West Sumatra Province, significantly lower than the

combined 34.96% of the vote for their supporting parties in the legislative election. This gap quantitatively reflects a split ticket voting rate of 20.91%, which can be interpreted as a strong indicator of weakening voter loyalty to parties and the dominance of candidate factors in shaping electoral preferences. The following table presents the split ticket voting for the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin pair in the 2019 Election in West Sumatra Province, based on official data from the final recapitulation results from the West Sumatra Regional General Election Commission (KPUD).

Table 4. Split Ticket Voting Data for Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf in the 2019 Election in West Sumatra

Political Party Votes	Jokowi-Ma'ruf Votes	Split Ticket Voting
34.96 %	14.05%	20.91%

In the context of West Sumatra Province, allegations of split ticket voting are most prominent among voters of the coalition parties supporting the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket. Although these parties received relatively high levels of support in the legislative elections, the 01 ticket's vote share in the presidential election was significantly lower. This disparity indicates a tendency for voters to differentiate their political preferences between legislative and executive elections. This phenomenon reinforces the assumption that some voters do not follow party directives linearly in the presidential election, but instead use different evaluative criteria, whether based on issues, candidate perceptions, or strategic considerations. The following table presents a more complete breakdown of split ticket voting based on the vote share of the coalition parties supporting the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin and Prabowo-Sandi ticket pairs in the 2019 Election in West Sumatra Province.

Table 5. Split Ticket Voting in West Sumatra for Political Parties in the Coalition Supporting Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin

No	Party Choice	Presidential Choice Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno (Split Ticket Voting)	Presidential Choice Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf (Straight Ticket Voting)
1	PDIP	23.08%	73.08%
2	Golkar	89.36%	7.45%
3	PKB	85.71%	7.14%
4	Nasdem	86.30%	13.70%
5	PPP	90.91%	9.09%

Table 6. Split Ticket Voting in West Sumatra for Political Parties in the Coalition Supporting Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno

No	Party Choice	Presidential Choice Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf (Split Ticket Voting)	Presidential Choice Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno (Straight Ticket Voting)
1	Gerindra	5.3%	92.05
2	Demokrat	32.31%	64.62%
3	PKS	14.81%	83.33%
4	PAN	20.00%	60.00%

One of the main focuses of this study is to examine the influence of party identification (party-ID) on voting behavior in the context of split ticket voting, focusing on voters from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two parties generally associated with relatively strong and consistent ideological bases. Initial assumptions suggest that voters from these two parties tend to exhibit straight-ticket voting tendencies, namely choosing legislative and executive candidates from the same party or coalition. For example, PDI-P voters are predicted to vote for the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket, while PKS voters are predicted to support the Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno ticket. This assumption is based on the ideological closeness between voters and their chosen parties, which is expected to strengthen the consistency of electoral behavior.

The analysis in this study is not limited to the aggregate level of vote acquisition but also takes into account the psychological dimensions of voters, particularly through the variable of party identification (party-ID). In this study, party-ID is operationalized through two main indicators: direction, which refers to a voter's affiliation with a particular party, and strength, which refers to the extent of a voter's emotional attachment and loyalty to that party.

In West Sumatra Province, the level of party-ID was recorded at 15.45% of the total survey respondents. The key question posed in this context is: of the proportion of voters with party-ID, what percentage voted for the parties supporting the Prabowo-Sandi ticket, and what percentage voted for the parties supporting the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin ticket?

By comparing the direction of party affiliation and presidential candidate preferences among voters who claim to have party-ID, the extent of split ticket voting can be identified more accurately and at a micro level. This approach allows for exploration of the relationship between partisan identification and actual electoral behavior, while also testing the extent to which individual-level voter preferences align with the basic hypotheses of voter behavior theory.


2. The Weakening of Party-ID and its Implications for Split Ticket Voting

This decline in party-identity is largely due to a crisis of public trust in political parties, which have failed to fulfill their primary functions as institutions of representation, political recruitment, and interest aggregation. This failure has resulted in the delegitimization of political parties in the public eye. National surveys consistently show that political parties have the lowest level of trust among other democratic institutions. If this trend is not reversed, voters' affective attachment to political parties will continue to erode, and Indonesian electoral politics will become increasingly mired in short-term transactional relationships. Further implications include rising political costs, a deteriorating quality of democracy, and the normalization of vote-buying as the primary form of interaction between parties and citizens.

Theoretically, the link between declining party-identity and the rise of split-ticket voting has been confirmed by numerous international studies. In the United

States, the rise in split-ticket voting since the 1960s has long been associated with declining voter partisanship. Studies show that independent voters or those with weak party identification are more likely to split their votes between legislative and executive candidates from different parties. A similar trend occurred in Russia, particularly in the 1995 State Duma elections, where nearly 40% of voters engaged in split-ticket voting, one of the highest rates globally. This high rate was driven by two main factors: (1) weak individual ideological preferences, and (2) the strategies of major parties encouraging voters to split their votes to maximize electoral representation.

In the Indonesian context, the downward trend in party-ID has also been confirmed through longitudinal data. A March 2013 survey by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) showed that only around 14.3% of Indonesian voters reported having a strong party affiliation. This figure represents stagnation, even a decline, compared to the results of the previous two years. This finding reinforces the suspicion that Indonesian electoral politics is experiencing symptoms of dealignment, where political parties are losing their function as anchors of voters' political identity. The consequence is an increase in volatile, personalistic, and pragmatic electoral behavior, including split-ticket voting. The following is longitudinal data on party-ID in Indonesia from 2003 to 2013:



Sumber: Lembaga Survei Indonesia

Figure 2. Longitudinal Party-ID Data in Indonesia (2003-2013)

The declining trend in party identification (party-ID) in Indonesia reflects a political dynamic that deserves serious attention. This phenomenon is primarily driven by the poor performance of political parties in meeting public expectations, particularly in terms of accountability, transparency, and institutional integrity. Numerous corruption scandals involving party elites have further eroded public trust in party institutions. Unless systematic and comprehensive internal reforms are immediately implemented, the psychological distance between voters and political parties is expected to continue to widen.

This situation has a direct impact on the rising costs of politics, as in a context of low public trust, political parties are often forced to rely on transactional strategies to maintain electoral support. Voters who lose affection for their parties tend to adopt a rational-instrumental approach to their choice, where material incentives are the

dominant factor. Within this framework, the rise of money politics at the grassroots level can be understood as a direct consequence of parties' failure to build a positive performance image and a sustainable emotional connection with constituents. Thus, the weakening of party-ID is not merely a psychological symptom of individuals but also reflects a crisis of institutional legitimacy in the contemporary Indonesian party system.

3. The Effect of Party-ID on Split Ticket Voting in West Sumatra

This research provides a critical contribution to party identification (party-ID) theory as formulated by Morris P. Fiorina, particularly in explaining the phenomenon of split-ticket voting. Within her theoretical framework, Fiorina argues that party-ID is dynamic and tends to weaken as voter behavior volatility increases. One of Fiorina's main hypotheses is that weakening party-ID will directly increase voters' tendency to split their votes between parties, as affective attachment to a party is no longer the primary determinant of electoral choice.

However, the findings of this study reveal the opposite pattern. When party-ID is at a low level, split-ticket voting does not necessarily increase significantly. Conversely, even under conditions of strong party identification, split-ticket voting can still occur. This means that consistency of choice between legislative and presidential elections cannot be used as a sole indicator of the strength of party-ID. This challenges the fundamental assumption of Fiorina's theory, which tends to view the relationship between party-ID and split-ticket voting as linear and causal.

Based on the data analysis, for both the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin and Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno voter groups, the positive correlation between low party ID and high split ticket voting was not consistently evident. Low party ID does not always correlate with a tendency to split votes, and conversely, high party ID does not guarantee electoral consistency across election types. When the voter base is analyzed separately, the effect of party ID on split ticket voting is not statistically significant.

The main contribution of this research lies in reinterpreting the relationship between party ID and split ticket voting, which enriches the literature on voter behavior in the context of multiparty systems. Key findings from this study indicate that split ticket voting can still occur under conditions of strong party ties, and conversely, low party ID is not always the primary driver of vote splitting. Thus, this research challenges the assumption of a negative causal relationship that has been the main foundation of Fiorina's theory.

The implications of these findings are two-pronged: theoretically, a new conceptual approach is needed that accommodates the role of mediating variables, such as candidate personalization, issue perceptions, or campaign strategies. Empirically, these results indicate that party-ID in the Indonesian context has unique characteristics that cannot be fully explained through theoretical frameworks based on a two-party system like that in the United States. Thus, this study is not only a

verification of existing theories but also propositional, offering a reinterpretation within the complex and dynamic context of Indonesia's electoral democracy.

An empirical example from the 2019 elections in West Sumatra Province illustrates the dynamics of party-ID within the context of Indonesia's multiparty system. In this province, the Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno ticket won 85.95% of the vote in the presidential election, while their coalition of political parties only secured 64.38% in the election for members of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI). This 21.57% difference indicates support for presidential candidates that transcends formal party affiliation, or in other words, voters voted for candidates from outside their chosen party in the legislative elections.

However, the rate of split ticket voting in this region is relatively low, indicating that factors such as candidate charisma, perceptions of personal leadership, and non-partisan ideological orientation play a significant role in shaping voter preferences. This also suggests that consistency between legislative and presidential choices is not always determined by the strength of party affiliation, but rather by more contextual and situational short-term factors.

This finding can be analyzed within the conceptual framework offered by The American Voter, which states that party identification is a stable factor in voting behavior, but can still be influenced by short-term factors such as issues, candidates, and economic conditions. In the context of West Sumatra, survey results show that only 15.45% of voters reported having a clear emotional or ideological affiliation with a particular political party. This low figure reinforces the argument that the majority of voters in the region fall into the category of weak partisans. The following table shows party-ID data in West Sumatra for the 2019 election.

Table 7. Party Identification (Party-ID) in West Sumatra

Item	Party ID - Yes	Party ID - No
Do you feel closer to/have a closeness to a particular political party?	15.45%	84.55%

Source: Face-to-Face Survey Data Processed by the Author in September 2023

This situation creates greater room for non-partisan factors to influence electoral behavior, such as candidate personalization, image-based campaigns, or local issues. Thus, low levels of party ID do not automatically result in high levels of split ticket voting, but rather open up the possibility of non-partisan electoral consistency, especially when candidates have strong personal appeal and align with voters' social identities or local values.

However, applying this model requires methodological caution, particularly in addressing endogeneity issues and the need for longitudinal data capable of tracking changes in individual political orientations over time. In the Indonesian context, this approach is particularly relevant given the volatile characteristics of voters, the competitive multiparty system, and the complexity of simultaneous elections such as the 2019 elections.

In this approach, the focus of analysis shifts from the structure of party support to the behavior of individual voters who psychologically express their attachment to

a party. This allows for a dichotomy between voters with strong party ID and those with weak party ID. Voters with strong party identification tend to show consistency between legislative and executive preferences, while voters with weak party identification are more susceptible to voter volatility and more easily influenced by candidate personalities, pragmatic issues, or other non-partisan factors.

Thus, in this study, split ticket voting is understood as a function of the direction and strength of party identification. The stronger the emotional affiliation with a party, the more likely voters are to be consistent in choosing legislative and presidential candidates from the same coalition. Conversely, when party identification is weak, voters are more likely to split their preferences, leading to increased split ticket voting. This approach opens up deeper analytical space to understand the interplay between psychological, sociological, and institutional factors that shape electoral behavior in Indonesia.

4. Results of The Party-ID (PI) Structural Model Analysis on Split Ticket Voting in West Sumatra

The quantitative analysis shows that party identification (party-ID) has a significant negative effect on split-ticket voting behavior. This means that the stronger a voter's identification with a particular political party, the less likely they are to split their vote between legislative and executive elections. The negative and statistically significant regression coefficient value strengthens the evidence for an inverse relationship between party-ID strength and split-ticket voting tendencies, and indicates that this relationship is not a coincidence. The following table shows the validity and reliability test for the construct variables.

Table 8. Construct Validity and Reliability Table

Variable	Code	Cronbach's Alpha	Composite Reliability (rho_a)	Composite Reliability (rho_c)	Average Variance Extracted (AVE)
Party-ID	PI	0.933	0.943	0.945	0.710

This finding aligns with the classic theory put forward in *The American Voter*, which states that individuals with strong psychological and emotional affiliations to political parties tend to be consistent in their electoral preferences. In the Indonesian context, where legislative and executive elections have been held simultaneously since 2004 and further consolidated in the 2019 elections, strong party identification appears to function as a primary determinant of choice orientation, encouraging voters to cast their votes uniformly at all election levels as an expression of political loyalty. The following table shows the HTMT values.

Table 9. HTMT Value Table

Variable	HTMT Value
Split Ticket Voting (STV) Party-ID (PI)	0.175

Based on the SEM analysis results presented in the table, it can be seen that for the Party ID variable, all constructs have outer loading values above 0.40. Therefore, all constructs will be included in the analysis. The following is a table of outer loadings for the Party ID variable and a table testing the hypothesis of the direct effect of Party ID on split ticket voting based on the path coefficient.

Table 10. Outer Loading Table for Party ID Variable

Construct	Outer Loading Value	Conclusion
P88	0.896	Valid
P89_1	0.826	Valid
P89_2	0.887	Valid
P89_3	0.818	Valid
P89_4	0.812	Valid
P89_5	0.829	Valid
P89_6	0.822	Valid

Table 11. Hypothesis Test Results Table: The Direct Effect of Party ID on STV Based on Path Coefficients

Variable	Coefficients	P-Values	Conclusion
Party-ID → Split Ticket Voting	-0.185	0.001	Influential

This finding can also be explained through the approach of political choice stability theory, which emphasizes that voters with high party-ID generally have more stable political attitudes and tend to be less influenced by situational factors, such as candidate personalization, campaign narratives, or issue fluctuations. In Indonesia's complex, multi-party electoral system, party-ID functions as a kind of "political compass," helping voters navigate electoral choices in a more structured and consistent manner. The following table presents the party-ID latent variable and its constituent indicators.

Table 12. Table of Research Variables and Indicators

No	Variable	Indicator	Code
1	Party ID	Feeling closer/having a closeness to a particular party	PI_1
		How close are you to that political party?	PI_2

In contrast, voters with weak party identification or those who are non-partisan (independent) tend to be more pragmatic and flexible in making their choices. They are more open to the influence of short-term factors and are more likely to split their votes between presidential candidates and legislative parties from different coalitions, making them more susceptible to split-ticket voting. Therefore, the results of this study confirm that the strength of political affiliation remains a crucial determinant of electoral behavior, even in a competitive and dynamic electoral system like Indonesia.

E. CONCLUSION

This study shows that party identification (party ID) significantly influenced the tendency to split ticket voting in the 2019 Simultaneous Elections in West Sumatra Province. The analysis confirms that the stronger a voter's emotional affiliation with a

party, the less likely they are to split their choice between legislative and executive elections. This finding aligns with the classic theory from *The American Voter*, but also critiques Fiorina's retrospective approach, showing that strong party ID can still coexist with split ticket behavior in certain contexts. The primary contribution of this study lies in reinterpreting the relationship between party ID and split ticket voting in Indonesia's complex multiparty system. Low party identification does not necessarily result in high split ticket voting behavior, and conversely, strong party affiliation does not guarantee full electoral consistency. This underscores the importance of considering psychological factors, candidate personalization, and the institutional context of elections in understanding voting behavior. Practically, these findings have important implications for political parties and election organizers. To reduce transactional political practices and increase consistency in voting behavior, political parties need to rebuild public trust and long-term ideological affiliation. Meanwhile, from an academic perspective, this research opens up space for further development in examining party-ID dynamics in an era of voter volatility and simultaneous elections.

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